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As concerns of “reform fatigue” in lower- and middle-income countries have become
more widespread, so has the search for ways of boosting support for market-oriented
reforms. Although the effects of political institutions on reform results have been
extensively analyzed, there has been relatively little investigation of their effects
on public opinion. We argue that constitutional and extra-constitutional reforms
that place limits on the discretionary authority of public officials and enable voters
to monitor, reward, and sanction politicians can enhance the legitimacy of market
reforms. We present a voting model with asymmetric information to illustrate
that these formal-legal reforms provide a credible signal of reformers’commit-
ments. Using panel data based on public opinion barometers from Eastern
Europe and Latin America, we examine the effects of political authority on pub-
lic support for markets. We find that constraints on the power of the executive
branch boost support for markets but that this effect declines as the reform pro-
cess matures. [JEL D72, P16, P26]
R
eform fatigue” in lower- and middle-income countries has become a concern
of country governments, donors, and multilateral development institutions
alike. There has been much recent recognition that, without legitimacy, economic
reforms can erode public trust in markets—even as they may succeed in other
respects (World Bank, 2004a). In this regard, many reform efforts in the 1980s
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and 1990s fell short, because their outcomes were often perceived as inequitable,
unjust, or otherwise inconsistent with prevailing social norms in the countries in
which they were implemented. These episodes also generated backlashes against
reform-oriented governments, because opposition groups from Poland to Peru dis-
covered they could win elections by promising to repair the adverse effects of
market reforms.
One of the solutions commonly sought as a means of preventing reform
fatigue is “good government”—specifically, expanding political constraints on
policy decisions by strengthening the legislative branch, making the civil service
more transparent, improving the independence of judiciaries, and enhancing both
the autonomy and responsiveness of subnational governments (see, for example,
Camdessus, 1997; and Ortiz, 2003). These are the veto players in the political
process—actors whose assent is required for policy decisions; they can effec-
tively restrain the executive branch and limit the discretion of public officials.
There is now general acknowledgement, moreover, of the need to pair economic
reforms with reforms to political institutions (Kuczynski, 2003). This represents
something of a reversal from the conventional wisdom of a decade ago, when
strategists typically emphasized the need to insulate reformers from public pres-
sures (Williamson, 1994).
We seek to understand whether reforming the institutions of the state can boost
public support for market reforms. Although there have been numerous investi-
gations into the effects of political institutions on market-oriented reform outcomes,
there has been comparably little analysis of their influence on public opinion—
even as the role of public opinion in shaping the success or failure of economic
reforms has been accepted (see, for example, Cabanero-Vervosa and Mitchell,
2003). We begin by examining the potential ways in which economic reform
can shape public opinion towards markets. In particular, we examine how the polit-
ical consequences of economic reform can push public opinion in potentially oppo-
site directions.
We then present a simple voting model with asymmetric information to illus-
trate the political benefits of implementing formal-legal reforms that increase the risk
associated with engaging in corrupt behavior when voters are concerned about
expropriation by governmental and economic elites. Here we focus primarily on
restructuring the rules and procedures of government in ways that place limits on the
discretionary authority of public officials and that consequently better enable voters
to monitor, reward, and sanction politicians. At the core of the model is the assump-
tion that these political-institutional reforms provide voters with credible signals of
politicians’ commitments to improve the welfare of all citizens. Reformers who
are willing to establish constitutional and extra-constitutional mechanisms that make
politicians and public officials more accountable to citizens restrict their ability to
accumulate private benefits; this willingness can boost public perceptions of the
legitimacy of markets. The benefits of signaling intent through these political reforms,
however, diminish as the complexity of market reforms advances.
Our analysis focuses on two regions whose countries have experienced sig-
nificant reforms to their market mechanisms: the post-communist “transition”
countries of Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS),and Latin America. Based on public opinion barometers for a sample of countries
in each region, we examine the effects of changes in political constraints on pub-
lic confidence in and support for markets. We find that increasing the number of
veto players in government can make the public more favorably disposed toward
markets, but we also find that this effect declines as the reform process matures.
We find, additionally, that these relationships often vary as much within each region
as they do between regions.
I. Neo-Liberal Reform and Public Opinion
There has been relatively little cross-national investigation of what moves public
opinion during periods of pro-market reform. The conventional approach has been
to assume that citizens base their opinions on how they perceive their own economic
circumstances. However, this approach, which has been formalized in models of ret-
rospective voting, has come under greater scrutiny in recent years. Empirical analy-
ses of voting behavior in the United States and Europe, for example, have suggested
that voters are as likely to be concerned with wider economic outcomes as they are
with their personal welfare. Moreover, it is not clear when voters blame their gov-
ernments for adverse economic conditions (Harrington, 1993; and Anderson, 1995).
Finally, it is also likely that, during periods of extraordinary economic transforma-
tion, citizens interpret changes in economic conditions differently than they would
under normal conditions (Stokes, 2001a). We explore below some alternative expla-
nations of what may move public support for reform based on the principal experi-
ences of two regions: Eastern Europe/CIS and Latin America (Figure 1).
Although the countries of Eastern Europe/CIS and Latin America initiated
reforms under different circumstances, there were several commonalities between
them. Countries in both regions liberalized financial markets, opened up markets to
foreign investment and trade, privatized public enterprises, and deregulated mar-
kets. Moreover, reforms in both regions often occurred alongside major political
transformations—namely, the end of Communist Party rule and the breakup of the
U.S.S.R., or the eclipse of authoritarian rule.
Leaving aside the effects of economic performance on public opinion, citizens
in these countries have also blamed market reforms for endemic corruption, politi-
cal stalemate, instability, and the increased vulnerability of many segments of the
population to economic deprivations. In particular, citizens in reforming economies
face two types of risks that threaten to undermine support for markets—a risk of
expropriation and a risk of policy fragmentation.
Expropriation by Elites
The first risk is that public officials will exploit their positions to extract private ben-
efits at the expense of other citizens. All reforms offer numerous opportunities for
arbitrage and rent seeking. In the 1990s, this came to be seen as one of the main
obstacles to growth recovery—not that reforms would not be implemented but that
they would be partially implemented, only to be halted by elites who prospered from
arbitrage between reformed and unreformed parts of the economy and who then
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Middlemen collected large profits by importing goods at subsidized exchange rates
and selling them to final producers at higher domestic prices. Mafiosi extorted pro-
tection payments where property rights and contracts were poorly enforced. In
Russia and Ukraine, the “oligarchs” acquired wealth by underbidding for natural
resource firms in noncompetitive auctions, by obtaining subsidized credits in spe-
cific industries, or by trading in commodities purchased domestically at regulated
prices and sold abroad at deregulated prices. The typical oligarchs were former gov-
ernment officials who had exploited their relationships with ministries, privatization
agencies, and state-owned banks to acquire wealth (see, for example, Shleifer and
Treisman, 2000).
In these countries it was common for oligarchs to “buy off” legislators (in
Ukraine, several oligarchs eventually became legislators) and thus control law-
making processes (Åslund, 2000). In Central Asian nations, former high-ranking
members of the Communist Party remain in control both of the apparatus of gov-
ernment and of the levers of the economy. Even in the states of Central Europe and
the Baltics, asset-stripping by new enterprise owners threatened to undermine pop-
ular support for reform by the mid-1990s (Johnson and others, 2000).
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Notes: Support for reform is the percentage that answer in the affirmative, less the percentage that 
answers in the negative, to a regional survey question on whether respondents believe that a market 
economy is in the country’s best interest.
Figure 1. Average Support for Reform by RegionInevitably, left-wing governments replaced initial reform governments in many
transition countries. Two electoral outcomes, however, attest to the fact that support
for reforms was undercut not by any animus toward markets but, rather, by resent-
ments toward the newly rich or toward those who had obtained their wealth as a
result of illegal activities or their status in the old regimes. First, these new gov-
ernments generally continued the reform process initiated by their predecessors.
Second, the Communist Parties that transformed themselves into pro-market social
democratic parties tended to be better represented than those that retained their
hard-line platforms or evolved into other anti-market (for example, nationalist) par-
ties (Åslund, Boone, and Johnson, 2001). Survey data from transition countries sug-
gest that a majority of citizens often demanded more radical reforms and that citizens
in countries implementing rapid reforms were more likely to believe their countries
were heading in the right direction (Warner, 2001).
Political constraints serve as a potential protection against expropriation by
interlinked political and economic elites. In particular, political reforms that dis-
perse political power beyond narrow elites should limit the ability of these groups
to expropriate rents from the reform process. In sum, the establishment of additional
veto points, in limiting the expropriation risk in market reforms, should boost their
popularity.
Policy Fragmentation
The second risk is that political struggles between organized groups—unions, busi-
ness associations, farmers, and so on—will delay vital reforms, cause them not to
be implemented, or cause them to become polarized and paralyzed in the govern-
ment. In Latin America, the reform eras are commonly remembered as periods of
electoral volatility and of protracted struggles between fractious political parties
(Corrales, 2002). Moreover, politicians’populist excesses may have led more recently
to disappointments with the functioning of democratic government (Kurtz, 2004;
and Lora and Olivera, 2005).
The possible side effects of fragmentation in reform processes are numerous,
but all have the potential to turn public opinion away from support for economic
reform and for markets in general. By many accounts, after the “lost decade” of the
1980s, many citizens came to be persuaded that the bitter pills of reform entailed
both costs and benefits. Debates about these costs and benefits occupied a promi-
nent place in critical elections (in Mexico in 1988, in Argentina and Brazil in 1989,
in Chile and Peru in 1990, and in Bolivia in 1993). Although some of the winning
candidates (for example, Menem in Argentina and Fujimori in Peru) may have cam-
paigned as anti-reform, they generally accepted the need to adopt reforms that
might have been opposed by some of their constituencies (Stokes, 2001b).
Reform governments, therefore, could not claim extensive mandates. Moreover,
in-fighting and conflicts with opposition groups in legislatures often delayed the
adoption of reform programs. Where reform programs were implemented, they were
often rife with transfers and remunerations dictated by patronage. In Peru, for exam-
ple, Fujimori’s government poured money into public works and anti-poverty pro-
grams prior to elections (Schady, 2000). In Mexico between 1989 and 1994, the
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heavily skewed toward municipalities dominated by the governing Institutional
Revolutionary Party (Diaz-Cayeros and Magaloni, 2003). Electorally driven trans-
fers in Latin American countries had a limited impact on actual poverty reduction;
more commonly, they merely worsened countries’ fiscal stances and exacerbated
business cycles (Schuknecht, 2000; Gonzalez, 2002; and Mejía Reyes, 2003).
And inevitably, by the end of the 1990s, governments that had reneged on
promises and that had been in power for lengthy periods began to face stronger
social resistance to their policies as well as electoral punishment. As in Eastern
Europe, a number of social democratic governments were elected by the end of the
decade in Brazil (1998),Argentina (1999), Chile (2000), Peru (2001), and perhaps
Mexico (2000). But as in the transition countries, these new governments did not
abandon reform programs as much as they watered down certain components—for
example, health reform or labor reform—opposed by key constituencies.
This basic idea—that political fragmentation can limit reform progress—has
appeared in a number of incarnations in formal models. War-of-attrition models
argue that coordination failures stem from the political advantage that groups have
in “holding out” against their opponents, delaying the implementation of reforms
that are in the public interest (Alesina and Drazen, 1991). Other models have sug-
gested that coordination failures stem from uncertainty about the postreform envi-
ronment (Rodrik, 1993; and Laban and Sturzenegger, 1994). In common-property
models of this problem, coordination failures prompt politicians and interest
groups to deplete stocks of assets (for example, government revenues or foreign-
exchange-generating industries) necessary to sustain reforms (Velasco, 1997).
Although these models do not directly address the consequences for public
opinion, the implication is clear: where policy fragmentation and stalemate charac-
terize the politics of market reform programs, public opinion will sour toward eco-
nomic reforms. Under these conditions, incorporating additional veto players into
policymaking dialogues and procedures can exacerbate the problems of fragmenta-
tion. Meanwhile, limiting executive authority restricts the ability of the executive to
circumvent stalemated legislatures. Consequently, greater political constraints, in
this view, can potentially dampen public support for reforms.
The Effect of Reform Maturity
We are left, therefore, with two diametrically opposed hypotheses regarding the pur-
ported effects of enhanced political constraints on public support for market reform.
According to one view, institutional limits on executive power, which restrict the
ability of public officials to expropriate wealth, can increase public support for mar-
ket reforms under conditions of economic uncertainty. On the other hand, checks on
the authority of the central government can also delay needed reforms, worsen eco-
nomic conditions, and heighten public antipathy toward markets. How can these be
reconciled?
We argue that the risk of elite expropriation is greatest in the early phases of the
reform process, when relationships between constituencies (supporters and oppo-
nents) and reform politicians have not yet crystallized. Reforms in the initial phases
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are typically characterized by a lack of effective representation of group interests
owing to poorly institutionalized political parties, labor unions, and business lobbies,
in addition to greater uncertainty regarding the distribution of costs and benefits.
Although the ability of broad-based interest groups to influence policymaking in the
early stages of reform is limited, narrower elites with fewer collective-action prob-
lems and direct access to the state have few such difficulties.1 Figure 2 shows the
relationship: as structural reform ensues, expropriation risk declines.
As reform programs mature, the ties between interest organizations and politi-
cians become clearer. New policies generate their own supporters (and oppo-
nents) depending upon the resources available to different groups, who over time
acquire greater access to and representation in policymaking. Indeed, “second-
generation” reforms—reforms implemented following interest- and exchange-
rate adjustments, price and trade liberalization, privatization, and deregulation—are
commonly thought to involve more contentious questions, as well as to require
1At the outset of the postcommunist transition, for example, group demands were generally not filtered
through formal channels. Rather, smaller groups of firms—often single firms—were more likely to lobby




























































Source: Political Risk Services (2005). 
Notes:  Expropriation risk is taken from the “investment profile” component of the International
Country Risk Guide and is rescaled such that higher scores indicate greater risk.  The cumulative reform 
index is drawn from indices of structural reform normalized by regional maxima and minima.
Figure 2. Reform and Expropriation Risk, 1990–2002more technical skill (see, for example, Naím, 1994; and Krueger, 2000). More
important, the number of interests potentially affected in second-generation
reforms is much larger; consequently, groups representing these interests are often
far more vocal (Tommasi and Velasco, 1996).
This suggests two separate but related outcomes. First, whereas the risk of
expropriation diminishes as the reform process matures, the risk of policy frag-
mentation increases. Second, we should expect that the effect of enhanced checks
and balances on support for market reforms will be positive, provided that elite
behavior is constrained, but this effect will diminish as the reform process matures.
In the remainder of this paper, we formalize these views and test them against data
from Eastern Europe/CIS and Latin America.
II. A Simple Model
We develop below a two-period voting model with two sets of players: politicians
and voters. We distinguish between “committed” and “opportunistic” reformers,
that is, between those reformers who are genuine and those who are willing par-
ticipants in rent seeking. This information, however, is unknown to voters. In the
first period, the economy faces a reform imperative owing to crises, international
shocks, or other exogenous conditions. The incumbent chooses whether to imple-
ment reforms of state institutions—in particular, reforms that enhance political
constraints; the choice the incumbent makes serves as a signal to voters of the
incumbent’s “type.”A winning politician’s economic policy reform agenda is imple-
mented in the second period, following elections.
Politicians
The Period 1 incumbent is a reformer of unknown type, indistinguishable to voters,
whereas the challenger is the anti-reform candidate.2 The genuine reformer will try
to implement an agenda that benefits the public without collecting private bene-
fits. Successful welfare-increasing reform will, therefore, depend on both the
ability and motivation of the politician. Motivation and honesty, however, may
be insufficient because reform implementation requires some ability to over-
come the anti-reform opposition. Following expectations of the increasing com-
plexity of second-generation reforms alluded to in the previous section, we will
assume that later-stage reforms will be harder to implement, that is, the number
and strength of anti-reform groups will grow as the reform process matures. We
denote the probability of a successful reform attempt as δ(x), where x indicates the
maturity of the reform process and δ′(x) < 0.
Both types of politicians benefit from holding office. We denote the incum-
bency benefits for the genuine reformer as V. We also assume that the total size of
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2This model applies not to economies that have yet to reform but to economies that have already ini-
tiated the reform process and to economies in which reform-oriented incumbents face anti-reform chal-
lenges. If an anti-reform politician were the incumbent, reform outcomes would simply be explained by
the preferences of that politician because, by definition, reform would not be on the agenda of the incum-
bent government.the elite’s surplus from expropriating the reform process is B, and the share of that
surplus paid to the opportunist as a bribe is given by λ. In addition to choosing the
level of economic reform following elections, the incumbent also influences the
distribution of checks and balances and thus the degree of political constraints in
the political system, denoted by σ∈ [0,1]. The presence of veto players is costly
to any reformer because they increase the number of hurdles that politicians must
overcome to make policy decisions (Tsebelis, 2002). More important, the presence
of veto players also implies greater levels of monitoring by other branches and lev-
els of government and thus increases the risk that any corrupt practices will be
detected and punished. These institutional reforms, therefore, generate costs and
benefits for incumbents regardless of type,3 whereas other costs accrue only to the
opportunist. The optimal trade-off between the common costs and benefits is given
by the specific value σ ~ ∈[0,1]. To capture the effect of these constraints on the
punishment risk from engaging in corruption, we assume that the probability of
punishment is equal to σ and we normalize the politician’s utility, if sanctioned, to
zero. The expected payoff from corrupt actions for an opportunist, then, is (1 −
σ)λB.
The utility of a committed reformer can then be formalized as
where σ ~ corresponds to the optimal trade-off between the costs and benefits of con-
straints not specific to any type of politician, and Pr(σ) is the probability of win-
ning an election as a function of the incumbent’s choice of political constraints. To
increase their chances of reelection, reformers may deviate from the optimal trade-
off, σ ~, by increasing the level of political constraints. The loss from this deviation
is reflected in the first term.
Following the same logic, the utility of an opportunist is
Voters
Voters are all identical and vote sincerely for the incumbent, or status quo candi-
date. Different politicians correspond to different levels of economic reform, each
of which generates different levels of welfare for citizens. We denote the outcome
in which the committed reformer triumphs over opposition as “reform” (R), in
which the opportunist assumes power as “expropriation” (E), and in which the
anti-reform opposition wins (or where the opposition successfully blocks the
−
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3Benefits can take various forms, including reputational benefits for countries that improve political
accountability. But there is also, of course, a personal cost to politicians for institutional reforms that allow
closer scrutiny of governmental activities.reform agenda) as “reversal” (Q).4 It is assumed that voters are best off with
reform and worst off with expropriation, that is,
Based on the discussion above, we let utility under expropriation be a function of
the maturity of the reform process, with u′ x (E, x) > 0.
Voters base their decisions on what they expect the incumbent to deliver. We
refer to the prior probability that the incumbent is a committed reformer as α, while
the updated beliefs are given by α ~(σ) conditional on observing constraints σ. The
incumbent’s relative popularity also depends on a random variable ε drawn from a
distribution G( )—a valence characteristic that encompasses other factors that may
influence the standing of the incumbent; for example, perceived competency,
charisma, or ideology. The realization of ε is unknown to the incumbent, making
the mapping from σ to the electoral outcome uncertain. It follows that voters will
vote for the incumbent if and only if
If we rearrange terms, the probability that the incumbent wins is given by the
probability that
which can be represented as
Pooling and Separating Equilibria
Based on the derivation of voting behavior, the incumbent’s maximization prob-
lem can be defined as choosing σ to maximize the following function:
where Ω∈ {V, (1 −σ )λB}. The solution to this problem depends upon how voter
expectations are shaped by the incumbent’s choice of σ. Expectations in this case
are not a continuous function of institutional reform so we cannot rely on a first-
order condition. For comparative purposes, however, it is instructive to analyze a
−
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4These outcomes correspond to three distinct points along the so-called J-curve of reform, a continu-
ous representation of welfare as a function of reform progress. The status quo, from this perspective, rep-
resents an intermediate level of welfare, which is expected to deteriorate in the “valley of transition” before
improving (see, for example, Przeworski, 1991).benchmark case in which the probability of reelection is exogenous—that is, not
a function of σ. In this case it is easy to see that the committed reformer’s optimal
institutional reform is given by σ ~, while
defines optimal political constraint for the opportunist (denoted by the subscript o).
The relationship σ* o < σ ~ clearly holds as long as Pr( ) > 0. Hence, an opportunist
would undoubtedly choose a lower level of constraints than a committed reformer
if no strategic electoral concerns were involved.
By contrast, where the probability of reelection is a function of σ, the chance
of the incumbent’s reelection increases as the percentage of voters who believe
that the incumbent is a genuine reformer increases. Hence, opportunists will face
incentives to mimic committed reformers, whereas committed reformers will try to
distinguish themselves from the opportunists. Both incentives work in the direction
of greater constraints than that given in equation (8). Depending on the parameters
of the model, it is possible to identify two different outcomes: first, a separating
equilibrium in which the two types choose different σ and in which voters, being
able to anticipate this, can tell the types apart; and second, a pooling equilibrium
in which the opportunists mimic the reformers who, in turn, find it too costly to dis-
tinguish themselves from the opportunists, thus forcing voters to base their decision
on prior expectations.
It is possible to specify the conditions under which a separating equilibrium
exists as follows. There must exist a σ** > σ ~ such that (1) the committed reformer
is better off choosing σ** in order to be distinguished from the opportunist than
choosing σ ~ and having the opportunist masquerade as a committed reformer, and
(2) the opportunist is better off choosing σ* o than mimicking the committed reformer
and choosing σ** even though this means that the opportunist’s type is revealed. If
the set of such σ** contains more than one element, then the committed reformer
will select the lowest level of institutional reforms within that set. Formally, we
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Figure 3 shows utility as a function of σ, with the two leftmost functions cor-
responding to the opportunist, and the two rightmost functions corresponding to the
committed reformer. The shaded lines represent respective types’utility in the pool-
ing equilibrium, and the black lines correspond to the utility in the separating equi-
librium. Note that the opportunist is better off in the pooling equilibrium for any
choice of σ, whereas the reformer is better off in the separating equilibrium.
Consider the case in which both types choose their unconstrained best—σ* o and σ ~,
respectively. This would correspond to a separating equilibrium because voters
can identify incumbent type through the choice of σ, so utility is represented by
the solid lines. There are clearly no incentives for reformers to deviate from this
strategy unilaterally; opportunists, however, can increase their utility by mimick-
ing reformers and choosing σ ~. Hence, this cannot be an equilibrium.
This does not mean, however, that there exists a pooling equilibrium. This can
exist only if the committed reformer is better off choosing σ ~ (when the reformer
is being mimicked by the opportunist) than choosing some σ** > σ ~ such that the
opportunist is better off not mimicking. As Figure 3 is drawn, the condition for a
pooling equilibrium is violated. That is, there exists a σ** such that the utility of
the committed reformer (in this instance, represented by the solid line) is higher
than when choosing σ ~ (represented by the shaded line), whereas the opportunist is
better off choosing σ* o than choosing σ** and pretending to be a reformer.
The model shows how private information creates incentives for both types of
reformers to extend political-institutional reforms to boost their political support.
Opportunists will implement institutional reforms to mask their true intentions




Notes: σ is the level of political constraint.
U(•)
σ ~ σσ
Figure 3. Pooling versus Separating Equilibriashoot in order to separate themselves from the opportunists in the separating equi-
librium. Private information creates a link from political constraints to public sup-
port for markets because constraints effectively signal a lower risk of expropriation.
We can summarize this first outcome by the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: Support for market reforms is an increasing function of
political constraints.
The reform experiences of lower- and middle-income countries, of course, typ-
ically involve a protracted sequence of many different, discrete policies. In latter
stages, there is typically an increase in the number and variety of actors who must
collaborate, as well as the amount of information necessary, to design and imple-
ment major policy changes. Successive reform phases, therefore, will become harder
to implement. As we argued above, the consequences of expropriation are likely to
be greater in the initial phases of the reform process. To see clearly the effect of
reform maturity on the incentives to separate and mimic, we assume that G( ) is uni-
form with support on [0,1].5 This implies that G(ε) =ε , and with some reshuffling
the two conditions for a separating equilibrium can be rewritten as
and
The left-hand sides of the two inequalities show the political benefits to the com-
mitted reformer of separating from the opportunist, and to the opportunist of mim-
icking the committed reformer, respectively. Both of these benefits weaken as
reform maturity (x) increases. The committed reformer will face reduced incentives
to impose far-reaching institutional reforms that signal type because voters know
that both the cost of expropriation and the probability of successful economic reform
are smaller. On the other hand, this also implies that the political cost to the oppor-
tunists of being unmasked is lower, and they will thus have fewer incentives to
mimic reformers. Hence, the effect on the likelihood of a separating rather than a
pooling equilibrium is uncertain, but the political gain from further institutional
reforms is unambiguously lower. This implies the following relationship among
political constraints, popular support, and reform maturity:
Hypothesis 2: The effect of political constraints on popular support for
market reforms is weakening as the reform process matures.
















1− ( ) ( ) ( )− ( ) ( )+ ( )− ( ) ( ) ⎡ ⎣ ⎤ ⎦ > αδ
σ
xu R u Q u Q u E x V ,




Raj M. Desai and Anders Olofsgård
104
5This assumption merely simplifies the exposition; it is by no means necessary for the result.6Our core sample includes the following countries from each region: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and
Venezuela (in Latin America); Armenia, Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia,
Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, and Ukraine (in Eastern Europe/CIS). The
question regarding support for a market economy—the responses to which we use to construct our indica-
tor of support for market reform—has only appeared in LB surveys since 1998. Consequently, time periods
also differ across regional groups (1990 to 1997 for Eastern Europe/CIS, and 1998 to 2002 for Latin
America). When pooling the samples, we compensate for these different period observations, as noted
below, by including time dummies in our benchmark specifications. Note, finally, that surveys conducted in
the former Czechoslovakia and U.S.S.R. were republic-specific, allowing us to compare responses before
and after the breakups of these unions.
7These questions are worded slightly differently between surveys. In the CEEB:
Do you personally feel that the creation of a free-market economy, that is, one free from state control,
is right or wrong for our country’s future?
In the LB:
Do you somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree [with the following phrase]: a mar-
ket economy is best for the country?
Note that this different wording creates some problems for comparison between the two regions. First,
in the CEEB survey, the “future” is explicitly stated in the question, whereas in the LB survey it is not.
Second, possible answers to the CEEB question are “right,” “wrong,” or “don’t know,” but in the LB sur-
vey there are three possible answers in addition to “don’t know.”Although there are no perfect corrections
for these differences, we feel that the benefits from cross-regional comparison far outweigh the potential
for misinterpretation. We try to make responses to these questions comparable by performing two correc-
tions. First, rather than estimating solely the percentages that responded “agree” or “right,” we subtract the
percentage that answered in the negative from the percentage that answered in the affirmative to determine
the “net support” for market-based reforms. Second, when pooling responses, we always use country fixed
effects as a robustness check to correct for any country- or region-specific effects that cannot be readily
observed, including differences in the implementation of the surveys.
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III. Data, Estimation, and Results
Variables and Data Sources
Our central dependent variable—support for reform—is taken from two sets of
regional opinion surveys: the Central and Eastern European Barometer (CEEB)
and the Latinobarómetro (LB). The CEEB was conducted in 16 transition economies
between 1990 and 1997, and the LB has surveyed 17 countries each year since
1996.6 Following previous analyses of reform support in Eastern Europe/CIS
(Kim and Pirttilä, 2003) and Latin America (Lora, Panizza, and Quispe-Agnoli,
2004), we define support for reform as the share (by country) of respondents who
answer in the affirmative, less the share of respondents who answer in the nega-
tive, to a survey question on whether respondents believe that a market economy
is in the country’s best interest.7
Following the model, we hypothesize that institutional constraints on executive
power will influence support for market-based reforms and that this effect will be
conditioned on progress in previous reform efforts. As a measure of institutional
constraints, we use a widely available measure of the effective number of veto play-
ers in the political system (Henisz, 2000). This “political constraints” index relies
upon a simple spatial model to assess the extent to which politicians are constrained
in decision making, adjusted for diminishing returns to additional veto players.
To approximate the degree of progress in reforms, we derive an indicator of
structural reform based on the extent of price and trade liberalization, currency con-Raj M. Desai and Anders Olofsgård
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vertibility, and privatization. For Eastern Europe/CIS and Latin America, the indi-
cators are taken from two separate World Bank structural reform indices (De Melo,
Denizer, and Gelb, 1996; and World Bank, 2004b, respectively), both of which incor-
porate internal and external reforms, including reforms to prices, trade, and financial
and public sectors. There is no structural reform index that is strictly comparable
between these two regions, given the disparity in reform imperatives, sequences, and
programs. In addition to estimating relationships by regional subsample, therefore,
we also normalize both indices by regional maxima and minima to yield an index
ranging from 0 (least reformed) to 1 (most reformed) when pooling our samples.
Finally, we also include the following variables to control for purely economic vot-
ing: inflation (in natural logs), GDP per capita, the unemployment rate, GDP per
capita growth, and the Gini coefficient. A time trend is also included in all specifi-
cations. Descriptive statistics for all variables by subsample are listed in Table 1.
Results
Our initial results are presented in Table 2. Estimation is by ordinary least squares
(OLS), with standard errors adjusted for correlation across panels (Beck, 2001).
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics by Regional Subsamples
Standard Deviation
Mean Between Within Overall Minimum Maximum
Eastern Europe/CIS1
Support for reform 10.86 21.27 14.70 23.94 −46.26 63.86
Inflation 5.28 0.78 0.65 0.91 4.66 9.24
GDP per capita 7.88 0.63 0.11 0.58 6.64 9.23
Unemployment 8.25 4.29 2.23 4.59 0.08 16.40
Growth −2.03 5.28 6.82 8.19 −34.86 10.62
Gini 31.10 6.38 3.32 6.94 18.85 48.30
Political constraint 0.37 0.17 0.14 0.22 0.00 0.65
Polity index 0.87 0.17 0.80 0.16 0.15 1.00
Reform 0.74 0.20 0.13 0.22 0.07 1.00
Latin America2
Support for reform 33.25 14.48 7.43 15.73 4.13 62.20
Inflation 4.71 0.11 0.05 0.13 4.59 5.28
GDP per capita 8.10 0.59 0.03 0.56 6.84 9.07
Unemployment 10.14 4.32 1.40 4.48 2.10 20.50
Growth −0.15 1.81 2.77 3.29 −7.93 6.89
Gini 51.62 5.07 0.75 4.89 42.70 58.60
Political constraint 0.42 0.19 0.08 0.17 0.00 0.65
Polity index 0.89 0.08 0.06 0.10 0.55 1.00
Reform 0.59 0.10 0.04 0.10 0.38 0.81
Source: Authors’ calculations.
1Number of observations = 80, number of countries = 14, average number of years = 5.71
2Number of observations = 49, number of countries = 16, average number of years = 3.69POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS AND PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR MARKET REFORM
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We also model the error term as a first-order autocorrelated process, that is,
υit = µit +ρ υ it−1, and report rho (ρ) values. The resulting estimation thus yields
“panel-correct” standard errors, corrected for both contemporaneous and serial cor-
relation. Column (1) shows results when country-year observations for both regions
are pooled; in this specification, only the level of inequality has any effect on sup-
port for reform, whereas the measure of political constraints has no significant
effect. In the next two estimations, we separate the sample between Latin American
and Eastern European subsamples (16 and 14 countries, respectively). Separating
the sample in this way shows diverging effects of executive constraints between
regions. In Latin America, an increase of one standard deviation in the level of polit-
ical constraints lowers public support for markets by 5 percentage points; in Eastern
Europe, a similar increase boosts support for markets by 12 percentage points.8 This
Table 2. Support for Reform and Regional Effects
Eastern
Full Sample Latin America Europe/CIS Full Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Inflation −6.8975 3.1822 −0.4662 −1.3670
(4.6953) (7.9625) (2.4862) (2.5598)
GDP per capita −2.6865 −8.8011*** −4.2920 −8.2978***
(3.8242) (1.2546) (5.0447) (2.2691)
Unemployment 0.4067 −0.2817 0.7932 0.4645
(0.3554) (0.3488) (0.5807) (0.3658)
Growth −0.0015 −0.3639 0.1840 0.1838
(0.2969) (0.2645) (0.2919) (0.2176)
Gini 0.8572** 0.2378 −1.0075** −0.7506**
(0.3865) (0.2724) (0.4259) (0.3456)
Political constraint 19.5370 −22.1266*** 38.0520*** 44.9261***
(13.9901) (5.2789) (14.5754) (14.4419)
Latin America 95.4832***
(11.6534)
Political constraint ×− 71.6009***
Latin America (15.3922)
Trend −1.8913 −5.5435*** −4.6103** −5.2115***
(1.6731) (1.4316) (1.8089) (1.2433)
Number of observations 139 59 80 139
Number of countries 30 16 14 30
R2 0.2633 0.7415 0.3259 0.5316
ρ 0.5618 0.6428 0.5302 0.5527
Wald χ2 11.27 257.11 40.79 218.85
(Prob. > χ2) (0.1272) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: Dependent variable is support for reform. Estimation is with ordinary least squares with
corrections for contemporaneous and serial correlation. Panel-correct errors are in parentheses.
Coefficients on intercepts are not reported. Significance: ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
8These and the subsequent estimated values are obtained holding all other variables at their means.Raj M. Desai and Anders Olofsgård
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divergence is shown again when we re-pool the samples, add a regional dummy, and
interact this regional dummy with the political constraints index.
Table 3 presents the main tests of our central hypotheses. We include the region-
normalized measure of cumulative structural reform, lagged once, and interact this
term with the political constraints index in column (1). In this specification, a one-
standard-deviation increase in the political constraints index alone increases support
for markets by more than 22 percentage points. A combined increase in both the con-
straints index and the lagged reform index by a single standard deviation, however,
increases support by a mere 2 percentage points. Note that the degree of cumulative
progress in reform itself does not have any statistically significant impact on support
for markets, suggesting that market reforms alone do not generate or dissipate future
Table 3. Support for Reform and Initial Conditions
Two-Way Panel-Correct1 Panel-Correct1
Panel-Correct1 Fixed Effects2 Latin America E. Europe
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Inflation −6.3656 −1.8669 21.2256** −0.0993
(4.1242) (3.3544) (9.5635) (2.5835)
GDP per capita 4.9030 55.9981*** −8.7816*** −0.3069
(4.8809) (19.9990) (3.0125) (4.6275)
Unemployment 0.3151 −0.6775 −0.1217 0.2641
(0.4143) (0.8106) (0.3583) (0.6800)
Growth 0.2569 −0.4542 −0.3237 0.4236
(0.2796) (0.3156) (0.3449) (0.3224)
Gini 0.4043 −2.4813*** −0.1997 −1.0604***
(0.3502) (0.6236) (0.1582) (0.3796)
Political constraint 88.3994*** 120.5693*** 198.7487** 105.9750***
(26.9313) (25.9895) (78.5586) (26.9750)
Reform(−1) 2.1272 47.5353** 154.3879*** 18.8392
(23.1488) (22.6146) (55.0458) (19.6613)
Political constraints ×− 106.1204** −126.6035*** −376.0866*** −110.3526***
Reform(−1) (45.4419) (39.5901) (126.3432) (42.1498)
Trend −1.6318 −1.5826 −5.3583*** −4.0631**
(1.3015) (1.7291) (1.0785) (1.7128)
Number of observations 127 127 48 79
Number of countries 27 27 13 14
R2 0.3067 0.5201 0.6192 0.4003
ρ 0.5407 0.3056 0.4987
Wald χ2/F Test 34.86 5.29 1343.89 61.95
(Prob. > χ2/F) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: Dependent variable is support for reform. Coefficients on intercepts are not reported.
Significance: ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
1Estimation is performed using ordinary least squares with corrections for contemporaneous and
serial correlation. Panel-correct errors are in parentheses.
2Estimation is performed using country fixed effects and time dummies. Standard errors are in
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support for markets in any appreciable way. Rather, progress in reform conditions
the effect of institutional constraints on the legitimacy of markets.
Recall that the pooled sample combines two regions and time periods in which
different reform requisites were evident. To be sure, the character of reforms in tran-
sition economies in the early to mid-1990s is quite different from that of reforms in
Latin America in the last half of the 1990s. Thus in column (2) we rerun the previ-
ous estimation using two-way fixed effects to correct for these potential year- and
country-specific factors. In this specification, our previous results are replicated, sug-
gesting that the relationship among reform progress, political constraint, and support
for markets holds across time and country. Finally, as a further demonstration of the
universality of these relationships, in columns (3) and (4) we rerun our basic inter-
active specification within regional subsamples. Although there are some differences
in the statistical significance of some variables—particularly the Gini coefficient and
the lagged reform index—our basic results remain constant across regions. Political
constraints boost support for markets, but this effect is decreasing as cumulative
reforms proceed. This effect can be seen graphically in Figure 4, which plots the
conditional effect of political constraints on support across levels of cumulative
reform (the solid line), with 95 percent confidence intervals (the shaded lines).
Political constraints—essentially, institutionalized commitments to limit exec-
utive power and to protect individual and collective liberties from state authority—
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Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Notes: The figure plots the predicted effect of executive constraints on support for reform given the 
level of cumulative reform, based on regression model (4) in Table 4. are only one mechanism that can enhance accountability in government. The other is
democratic procedure—namely, citizen representation through contested elections;
one of the central tenets of democratic theory is that elections constitute a sanction-
ing device that induces public officials to do what voters want (Ferejohn, 1986; and
Manin, 1997). In one sense, political constraints and elections are complementary:
elections have been considered a “vertical” mechanism for accountability, whereas
separations of power and the presence of veto players are a “horizontal” mecha-
nism in that they require accountability between different branches of government
(O’Donnell, 1994). Consequently, it remains to be determined whether elections in
which citizens are able to select reform-oriented politicians can serve a parallel func-
tion as a political constraint in raising popular support for markets.
Table 4 presents our empirical observations of the effects of democratic elec-
tions. Column (1) replicates the first regression from Table 3, with the exception
that we substitute a measure of democratic contestation for political constraint. We
use the familiar Polity index of democracy, which is based on measures of the
openness of political participation and the level of competition in the selection of
political leaders (Marshall and Jaggers, 2001).9The Polity index has a similar effect
on support for markets as political constraint in both panel-correct and two-way
fixed-effects regressions. Once we include both measures in the same regressions
(columns (3) and (4)), however, the effect of the Polity index disappears.
This suggests that democratic elections are a relatively weaker accountability
mechanism than institutional constraints. Indeed there is evidence that several
regimes in Latin America and Eastern Europe/CIS hold relatively free elections but
have failed to restrict governmental authority or to protect basic rights (Plattner,
1999). Other analysts, similarly, have argued that elections are less likely to serve
as sanctioning devices but rather are more likely to be perceived by voters as oppor-
tunities to chose “good” over “bad” politicians, with little expectation of account-
ability (Fearon, 1999). There is also the possibility that, simply stated, political
representation may not achieve accountability as well as expected in reforming
governments and that citizen control over politicians in these countries is imperfect.
IV. Conclusions and Implications
At the heart of the issues addressed here lies a question that reformist governments
have often faced at the outset of their tenure: to what extent should reforms, in addi-
tion to implementing market-oriented prescriptions, extend to remaking the institu-
tions of the state? Debates on the pace and sequence of the transition in formerly
socialist economies addressed the relative advantages of executive constraints ver-
sus executive discretion, with “shock therapy” advocates concerned that changes
in political rules would divert resources from more important market-reform com-
ponents and with others arguing that a new constitutional order characterized by
constraints on state power would reduce the risks of rent seeking. Analyses of the
so-called second stage of reforms in Latin America have similarly been cloaked in
Raj M. Desai and Anders Olofsgård
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9The polity ranges from −10 to +10. We rescale as (10 + polity)/20 to yield a score that ranges from
0 (least democratic) to 1 (most democratic).the language of “good government,” in which the professionalization of the civil
service as well as the autonomization of legislatures, of subnational governments,
and of the judiciary have emerged as important goals.
This paper analyzed the effects of political constraints on public opinion toward
markets. We proposed a simple model in which politicians could signal their will-
ingness to prevent expropriation by elites and thus convince voters that the bene-
fits of reform would be widely shared. Data taken from public opinion barometers
in Eastern Europe and in Latin America in the 1990s showed that the creation of
Table 4. Political Constraint, Political Democracy, and Support for Reform
Two-Way Two-Way 
Panel-Correct1 Fixed Effects2 Panel-Correct1 Fixed Effects2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Inflation −11.7856*** −3.5552 −7.5206*** 0.4273
(2.5429) (2.9551) (2.5411) (3.6714)
GDP per capita 1.9815 22.1116 1.3184 54.4787**
(5.4585) (18.0859) (4.1406) (22.6645)
Unemployment 0.3680 −0.6619 0.1290 −0.5244
(0.5363) (0.8887) (0.4915) (0.8436)
Growth 0.2108 −0.0979 0.4632* −0.4733
(0.2211) (0.3280) (0.2730) (0.3290)
Gini 0.5328 −1.9133*** 0.3213 −2.4984***
(0.3810) (0.6594) (0.3844) (0.6670)
Polity index 110.2778* 122.5492** 80.1338 28.4906
(65.4844) (54.4044) (60.4276) (64.3184)
Reform(−1) 44.6561 194.1664** 29.6837 86.9674
(99.9690) (83.7050) (88.2919) (91.4376)
Polity index × reform(−1) −92.6400 −220.1511** −31.3971 −27.9077
(111.8581) (98.0383) (99.5162) (118.5737)
Political constraint 90.7345*** 123.4656***
(29.6511) (37.4415)
Political constraint ×− 133.1945*** −138.8245**
reform(−1) (44.6775) (57.3553)
Trend −1.8664 0.4236 −1.7457 −1.4705
(1.4512) (1.9715) (1.3327) (1.9066)
Number of observations 126 126 123 123
Number of countries 27 27 27 27
R2 0.3384 0.3427 0.3781 0.4637
ρ 0.6876 0.6351
Wald χ2/F Test 48.81 2.52 517.41 3.50
(Prob. > χ2/F) (0.0000) (0.0030) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: Dependent variable is support for reform. Coefficients on intercepts are not reported.
Significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
1Estimation is performed using ordinary least squares with corrections for contemporaneous and
serial correlation. Panel-correct errors are in parentheses.
2Estimation is performed using country fixed effects and time dummies. Standard errors are in
parentheses.
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increases the popularity of markets. The magnitude of this effect is heightened in
the earlier phases of reform, when the risk of expropriation by elites is perceived to
be the greatest, and diminishes as reforms proceed. With reform maturity, the risk
of expropriation is gradually supplanted by the risk of fragmentation and stalemate
and of intransigent conflicts between supporters and opponents of specific reform
programs. Strengthened political constraints do little to lessen these risks.
Greater appreciation of the vital functions that legitimacy and trust in markets
play in undergirding and sustaining economic reforms is needed. And a better
understanding of what sways public opinion should be a prominent part of any
assessment of reform feasibility. If the analysis presented above is correct, however,
it offers several implications for reform strategies as they are commonly carried out.
We mention two such implications here.
First, a reliance on communicating the benefits of economic reforms through
general public relations efforts or through informational campaigns focused on spe-
cific segments of the population may easily fail to change minds in the earlier stages
of reform. It is always difficult for reformers or their agents to communicate credi-
bly to voters, and it is most difficult in the early phases when the costs and benefits
of reform are unclear. But although talk is cheap, institutional reforms that limit state
power are not. They are also the clearest signals that a narrow class of elites will not
enrich themselves at the expense of the public.
Second, external “anchors”—in the form of international financing and trading
agreements, treaties, regional unions, and so on—may also fail to raise support for
market reform. A perceived commitment from reformers is critical for the various
private actors if behavioral changes are desired. Policies to restore fiscal balance
in public accounts will only increase investment if private agents believe that
macroeconomic stability will last. Deregulation will only increase job growth if
entrepreneurs believe that the elimination of administrative barriers will not be
reversed in short order. Under these circumstances, any institutional reforms widely
perceived as externally imposed will not bolster the credibility of—or replace—
signals from politicians to voters and, as a result, may not affect public support for
reform. By contrast, multilateral or bilateral support in the form of advice on the
mechanics of reforming the state that are then implemented by local reformers are
more likely to enhance the credibility of these signals.
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